The Battle of Kontum

AFTER THE DEFEAT OF THE 22ND ARVN DIVISION AT TÂN CẢNH – DAK TÔ - Phan Vũ

                After the Geneva Accord in 1954, the peace-loving South Vietnamese were living a peaceful time and a prosperous period. They traveled safely from Quảng Trị to Cà Mau by train or by bus.  There were no sabotages on the railroad, no road mining and no ambushes. Rice was cheap and abundant; markets were full of meat, fish and dried red shrimps. Life was then easy and happy. But starting 1960, the Vietcong Đồng Khởi uprising in Bến Tre Province in Mekong Delta started the war. Men, women and children began to be killed, kidnapped and drowned in the river; houses being burned, roads mined and farmers leaving their houses to the cities. Other social vices began to spread throughout Saigon and crowded cities.
After the disastrous defeat of their 1968 Tết Offensive, the Vietcong lost the majority of their Communist cells in the cities and countryside. Their guerrilla forces were wiped out. The People’s War became ineffective, facing the superior weapon power of the US and the ARVN forces. Hanoi Communist leaders had to adopt the conventional war, sending their best infantry divisions with heavy artillery and tanks to the South.
While the South Vietnamese were enjoying the 1972 Tết holidays and the spring season, General Võ Nguyên Giáp launched the Nguyễn Huệ Offensive, that the South Vietnam Armed Forces and the Americans called the Easter Offensive. A dozen of infantry divisions of about 200.000 Vietcong (Vietnamese Communists), armed with Soviet-made tanks, heavy artillery such as 102mm and 130mm cannons, and light sophisticated weapons such as B-40, B-41, anti-tank AT-3 (known as Saggers) and SA-7 antiaircrafts poured into the South Vietnam. Crossing the DMZ in masses, the North Vietcongs massacred the 3rd ARVN Division and fired into the escaping people, killing thousands of civilians and children.
Frightened by the fast success of the Vietcong forces in Quang Tri, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu replaced the political General Hoàng Xuân Lãm by the finest General Ngô Quang Trưởng. The excellent leader Trưởng reorganized the ARVN forces and expelled Vietcongs out of Quảng Trị. The first wave of the Nguyễn Huệ Offensive or the Easter Offensive was defeated.

In late April the second wave of the attack was on the Central Highlands. Like in Quảng Trị where the Americans and the 3rd ARVN Division were caught by surprise, the American advisors in the II Corps did not believe the reports given by Vietnamese officers on the presence of T-54 and T-59 tanks near Tân Cảnh-Dak Tô. Unprepared for the tank attack and lacking a well-organized defensive plan, the 22nd ARVN Division was overrun by the outnumbered Vietcong forces. A company of tanks, led by a VC (Vietcong) captain, rumbled straight into the commander Lê Đức Đạt’s bunker and fired round and round, destroying the command post and disheveling the 22nd ARVN Division. The following month that VC captain was killed in front of the 23rd ARVN Division command bunker in Kontum City when he repeated the same tactic as he had carried it out successfully in Tân Cảnh. In his logbook, he wrote that he had not met any resistance when his tank arrived at the 22nd Division Headquarters bunker opening. After the defeat of the 22nd ARVN Division at Tản Cảnh, the political and military situation in Pleiku and Kontum became serious and critical.

               How was the morale of the ARVN officers and soldiers in the Military Region 2 (MR 2)?
Like General Hoàng Xuân Lãm in the Military Region 1, General Ngô Dzu was rather a political general. Dzu was demoralized and haunted over the fate of Colonel Lê Đức Đạt. He fell ill with his heart disease. John Paul Vann saw Dzu withering in front of him and becoming ineffective in designing a defensive plan for the coming attack on Kontum City. Dzu hit rock bottom. Dzu thought that Kontum could not hold. He flew back to Saigon to report to President Nguyễn văn Thiệu who told him to hold Kontum.  Dzu then met the chief of the Joint General Staff, General Cao Văn Viên, secretly plotting to abandon the Highlands. He said to Viên that the new American strategy was to forsake the Highlands. But Viên did not listen to him. Pleading illness, Dzu requested to be relieved from the MR2 command. Dzu told Colonel Lý Tòng Bá to discuss the defensive plan with John Paul Vann and other American division advisors. He wanted to stay out of any planning of defensive designs. Before the VC forces started assaulting Kontum, General Nguyen Van Toan had taken over the command of the MR 2
The 22nd ARVN Division crumbled. The remnant officers and soldiers straggled to Kontum City, exhausted and discouraged. Their combat effectiveness went down at the lowest point. The battered 2nd Airborne Brigade was demoralized as well. Those brave red berets suffered a deep shock because never before had they been beaten badly. They rambled about together in groups, tired but showing no signs of fear. They needed a respite and they deserved it.
The 23rd ARVN Division soldiers remained calm and inflexible, waiting for the coming Vietcong to pay their crimes to South Vietnamese. All day long, they dug foxholes, fortified entrenches with burlap bags of sand, and practiced firing anti-tank M-72s at destroyed T-54 tanks. Regiment commanders sent out reconnaissance squads outside the defensive perimeter to gather information about the VC movements.  The 23rd ARVN Division and the Kontum Regional and Popular Forces were ready to fight.

                How was the American Advisors’ morale?
John Paul Vann was one of the bravest American Advisors. He was determined to hold Kontum at all cost. The bitterness of the Tân Cảnh defeat ran deep in him. The possibility of another defeat was round the corner. He told Colonel Rhotenberry one day that his credibility was at risk. But the unfaltering John Paul Vann never flinched and his real personality stood up. He knew where he could find the last hope, the last chance: that was Colonel Lý Tòng Bá. Vann had known Bá since the Ấp Bắc battle.

                Reasons why John Paul Vann chose Lý Tòng Bá:
John Paul Vann came back to Vietnam in 1966 when Bá was Bỉnh Dương Province Chief. Bá was surprised to see another Vann. He was wiser, more patient and more considerate. He was aware of Bá’s successive, victorious combats in the Mekong Delta. He found ways to support Bá’s initiatives and actions. In 1968 Tết Offensive, Bá exterminated a VC battalion attacking Bình Dương City Hall. That VC battalion had intended to trap and capture Bá alive. General Walter Dutch Kerwin pinned a Silver Star “V” device on Bá’s fatigues. John Paul Vann handed Bá a commemorative plaque at Bình Dương City hall. Now he knew Bá’s real personality. Vann recognized Bá was an experienced commander. Indeed, Bá had a good knowledge about military career. Bá won all his stripes on the battlefield. He got his promotions right after fight victories. Time and again Vann said, “Bá, You’re a brave and professional soldier” (Bá 127). Vann meant by that what he wrote about Bá in his book The Quagmire.
Through years on the battlefield, Bá could read VC commanders’ mind. He comprehended the Vietcong’s strength and weaknesses. He had a profound and clear knowledge of VC’s tactics and he could guess what, where and how VC commanders were going to attack. So, Bá certainly could design an effective plan for the defense of Kontum. There was a reciprocal respect and a mutual understanding. Bá admired Vann’s keen sense, quick mind and incredible courage. He was like Marshal Michel Ney, the bravest of the bravest marshals in the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte’s Grand Army. Vann, Bá and Rhotenberry were calm and fearless officers.
Bá and Vann shared the just cause of the Vietnam War.  Both wanted the South Vietnam to remain free and democratic. They did not want a Communist South Vietnam. Vann and Bá were the freedom fighters. Hating despotism, Communism and terrorism, they were the noble liberty leaders. Vann, Rhotenberry and Bá were attracted to each other by talent, military view, profession and strong desire for the just cause like birds of the same feather flocking together and like geniuses calling geniuses. Vann, Rhotenberry and Bá were like “objects and their shades.” Vann promised Bá that he would see Bá once a day no matter how crucial the military situation was. And Vann kept this promise. The last time Vann wanted to see Bá with an open bottle of Champagne, but unfortunately he could not make it.

                How were the White House and the Pentagon? 
They were anxious about the Highlands’ situation, eagerly expecting a victory in Kontum. At Vann’s request, the Pentagon sent the state-of-the-art anti-tank TOWs directly from the U.S. to Vietnam. A victory would prove that the Vietnamization could succeed and the American and South Vietnamese delegations would negotiate from the position of strength in the Paris conference.

AN EFFECTIVE PLAN FOR THE DEFENSE OF KONTUM CITY

RESHUFFLE OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

                The first thing Bá had to do was to find the American advisors having the same ideas of combat tactic as his, capable of helping him with completing his defensive plan instead of arguing with him. Bá wanted the real professional officers with initiatives based on the current situation. The reason was that the Vietnam War was a People’s War, totally different from the WWII and Korean Wars. In the II Corps, besides John Paul Vann, General Hill was in charge of the tactical air support. Gen. Hill saw to saving any effort and planning the aviation assets, naval gunfire and artillery support.
Colonel Bá did not feel comfortable working with the American division advisor, Colonel Robert Kellar who had different views of tactics from Bá’s. Both could not reach any compromises of action. Bá wanted Kellar out. Vann agreed to it and asked Bá which colonel he had known and he would like to work with. The name flashed in his mind: Colonel R. M. Rhotenberry. He was “a calm and fearless man, a Texan who talked less but worked hard” (Bá’s letters). Rhotenberry had been working with Bá in Binh Duong province in 1967. Five or seven days before the VC attack on Kontum, Vann’s Ranger landed down and Colonel Rhotenberry got out of the helicopter. Bá said he could not express his joy in seeing Rhotenberry in person in front of him. Bá and “Rhot” went along perfectly during the Kontum battle. 
The reshuffle at the top of the MR 2 pleased Bá very much. With Vann, Hill and Rhotenberry, the commitment of the lower advisory levels was total. But Bá was still concerned about another problem of “bickering below division level.” In Kontum, other counter-part units were commanded by colonels who resented taking orders from another colonel. If they wanted to refuse to obey Bá’s orders, they could ask for consent from their own chain of command in Saigon. They sometimes did not show up at the coordination combat briefings. That situation had happened in the I Corps when the Vietcong attacked Quảng Trị Province. To guarantee the complete cooperation and coordination of other Vietnamese commanders, Vann suggested that General Dzu and General Hill fly to Kontum daily at 8:00 to preside over staff meetings. Their presence strengthened Colonel Bá’s position, made sure other commanding colonels’ attendance, and observing orders perfectly.  Bá got the unity of command. That was a must Bá needed most.

SHIFT OF COMBAT UNITS:
The shift of the units was a topic of hot arguments between Vann and Bá. Vann’s plan was to regroup the survivors of the 22nd ARVN Division, the remnants of the 2nd Airborne Brigade, of the 6th Ranger Group, in addition of the 45th and 53rd Regiments of the 23rd ARVN Division for the defense of Kontum. Bá saw that the remnants’ morale was very low. They were exhausted and understrength. Their behavior and expression showed that they wanted to leave Kontum. Bá had a vision that those survivors would constitute a Chinese hot pot, “ta:-pin-loo” forces for “the hottest situation.” Carefully, skillfully and shrewdly, Ba managed to persuade Vann to send them back to Pleiku. He told Vann that in order to win the battle, he needed the unity of command and maneuver. His plan was to utilize his three own regiments of the 23rd ARVN Division to defense Kontum. Vann thought that Bá’s plan made sense and he agreed to it.  Right away, under Ba’s and Rhotenberry’s constant and vigilant supervision, the American Air Forces airlifted the 44th Regiment from southern Pleiku to Kontum during many successive nights. The mission had ended perfectly on May 14, 1972 before the VC attack started. Colonel Bá got what he needed to win the battle: the cohesion of American support, the unity of command and control and the unity to resist.

TACTICAL PLAN OF DEFENSE
                The defense plan encountered violent arguments between Bá and Vann and Kellar. After the defeat of Tân Cảnh and Dak Tô, Vann wanted to send the 6th Ranger Group, composed of two battalions, with the M-41 tank company to seize the firebase Lima on a strategic hill, about 6 miles north of Kontum City. This firebase overlooked a large forward area and controlled the Route 14, the only vital way along which VC forces had to pass to attack Kontum. Vann’s intention was to set up a strong resistance point, supported by air power, artillery forces and mobile reserve groups from the 23rd ARVN Division. Vann thought that the 6th Ranger Group could stand, defeating or at least damaging and blunting VC forces before their assault on Kontum.
Ba thought that plan was not wrong. But it was purely theoretical, a possible solution to a tactical lesson in a military school. The mighty US Army with different kinds of firepower could win any battle.  But the military situation in the MR 2 needed practical tactics. VC forces were armed with heavy cannons and light advanced weapons. After the Tân Cảnh - Dak Tô victory, VC General Hoàng Minh Thảo had freedom of maneuver on the battlefield. Thảo called the shots. The 23rd ARVN Division had to fight against three VC divisions. The soldiers’ morale was high but precarious at that time. Bá was careful in avoiding any negative event. He thought that the dispatch of the 6th Ranger Group was like a spoon of salt dropped into the sea. Moreover it was not necessary. (See the map)
While Bá tried to find out skillful and convincing arguments to persuade Vann, he reluctantly ordered Lieutenant Colonel Bé, the 6th Range Group commander, to seize and station the Hill Lima as Vann’s plan. But secretly Ba let Bé make decision when the combat situation became worse. Early May 1972, VC utilized their artillery power to hammer the firebase Lima. Before the VC attempt of assault on the Hill Lima, Bé left the firebase although he did not have the formal consent. Vann fell into a rage, pounding his fist on the table or overturning chairs. Calmly and patiently, Ba persuaded Vann with all plausible and assuring arguments. Slowly Vann understood the difficulties and problems that the ARVN soldiers were encountering. The Free South Vietnam’s Army was one of the Free World’s, facing the Communist Camp’s Armies: the Soviet Union’s, Red China’s…. The ARVN Army had been fighting VC forces and their allies’ for decades. It was a deadly, continuous and devastating war. Only one man could persuade Vann, legendary, intensely devoted and ardent in supporting the South Vietnam to win the Communists: that man was Colonel Lý Tòng Bá. 
Not long before the attack on Kontum, VC forces peppered the firebase Polei-Kleng manned by a Ranger battalion day and night. Finally, the communication between Polei-Kleng and Kontum was cut off.  Colonel Kellar wanted to send troop for a rescue. But Bá vehemently protested that rescue operation. Bá thought that VC General Thảo applied the tactic of “attacking a post and destroying rescue reinforcements.” While sending rescue troop, the ARVN forces would be thinning. Thảo was going to hack the thinning forces into sections and by surprise he struck straight the Kontum City. For there was a dangerous pass, a chokepoint with a dense forest between Polei-Kleng and Kontum City. 
Vann was still hesitant about Bá’s ideas. What Bá had predicted happened before Vann’s eyes.  When the first battalion of the 45th Regiment was going to reach that pass area, a helicopter gunship that escorted the battalion got hit by VC antiaircrafts. However the pilot managed to fly back to the departure point and landed down safely not far from where Vann stood. With Vann’s consent, Bá ordered to cancel the operation. After that event, Colonel Kellar left Kontum for the United States. 
Bá and Rhotenberry worked hard day and night to remove all isolated positions back to Kontum.  The resistance formation was a circular perimeter defense, the 23rd ARVN Division Command bunker considered the center of resistance. The circumference including the Hill 501 in the North and the airfield in the East and the Dabla river in the South was conceived as an iron belt around Kontum City and the city itself, a granite block. Bá and Rhotenberry seemed like “object and its shade”, planning together resistance maps in the commanding bunker, riding together on their jeep to check soldiers’ foxholes and crew-weapon bunkers. They did together the first aid and bandage to the wounded as medics. They flew together in helicopter to choose vantage points to set up secret forward observers.         
Bá wanted to inflict mass damage to VC soldiers by preparing free killing grounds when they showed up into their staging areas. Bá thought that his plan would be effective because the enemies would be decimated in the free killing grounds around the city before they reached the iron defense block.  Whenever unfortunately VC could penetrate deeply into the defense perimeter, his troop would be ordered to withdraw back quickly, presenting a killing ground for the artillery to hammer and then for the reserve task force composed of tanks and infantry to rout out all VC intruders (see map).
For the reserve forces, Bá set aside a battle-seasoned battalion supporting the 1/8th Armor Company of 10 M-41 tanks. They protected the division command staff bunker. Bá and Rhotenberry did not forget to design a counter-attack plan in case of an enemy penetration into the defense circle. To destroy enemy Soviet-made T-54 and Chinese-made T-59 tanks, the best soldiers were selected to take turns firing M-72 LAWs into old tank hulks. The arrival of anti-tank TOWs and their team boosted the ARVN soldiers’ morale. 
The Strategic Air Command had learned from experience and technology the effective employment of the B-52 bombers. The B-52 flew now in three planes rather than six to double their effectiveness on the Vietcong concentrations. Ba had creative initiatives about the high-flying B-52 air strikes. Bá requested that the safety range of B-52 bombing be shortened from 800 meters to 500 meters outside the defense perimeter. He knew that the VC soldiers would hug the belt of forward defense units to avoid bomb rain. The target zone, called “box”, was about one-kilometer wide by three-kilometer long could be placed at 500 yards from friendly positions. Before the coming of B-52s, the ARVN soldiers were informed to clog their ear canals by hands and bend their bodies down to foxhole bottom.
Bá, Rhotenberry and Colonel Ngô Văn Hùng, the Division Artillery commander, worked together to design mapped shelling sectors, counter-shelling and anti-shelling plans. Hùng secretly set up remote hidden vantage observer points outside the defense perimeters. Alternative cannon positions were prepared to move artillery pieces to elude VC shelling. The Artillery Regiment did an excellent job during the battle.         

LÝ TÒNG BÁ’s TACTICAL MANEUVER:
                1./ “Knowing well the enemy guarantees success” principle.
Colonel Bá was certain that VC General Thảo would seize the hill 501 on which he would mount mortars, rockets and cannons to hammer the center of resistance in the city before any assault on Kontum City. Therefore, Bá stationed the “fight and win” 44th Regiment on that hill. Bá knew Thảo would use the “One-prong deep drive” tactic attacking the 23rd Division Headquarters, by utilizing tanks and supporting soldiers. After the Tân Cảnh - Dak Tô defeat, the ARVN soldiers in the MR 2 were haunted by the presence of the heavy deadly T-54 and T-59 tanks. Therefore with the practice of firing old tank hulks by M-72 LAWs, soldiers would have the conviction that they were capable to destroy T-54 and T-59 tanks.  They would not be afraid of the coming VC tanks. Bá was also aware that Bộ Độis (Communist soldiers) were inexperienced and very young, about 16 or 17 years old. They were exhorted, indoctrinated by the false images of Hồ chí Minh, intimidated by their parents’ welfare, and lured by Communist party membership before any battle. So Bá urged the regiment commanders to knock down the first coming VC tanks to demoralize Bộ Dộis and dishevel them. An early victory would show VC soldiers that the Republic soldiers were superior experienced fighting men. That picture panicked them.

                2. / “Luring tigers out of their hiding places” principle.
Bá’s plan was to pull back all remote and isolated posts to Kontum and to designate areas for VC to show up for B-52s raining bombs, for cannon shelling, and for cobra gunships terminating the VC survivors. VC excelled in hiding in underground tunnels, in the forests and in the crowded villages. They attacked the Republic soldiers and American GIs by surprise and ambushes. Then they fled away, leaving behind the wounded villagers. Another VC tactic was Đánh co, đánh cụm, diệt cụm cứ điểm meaning Attacking the surrounding positions of the enemies one by one; so they had to regroup before destroying their main target. Sometimes they held villagers as human shields for their protection. After they fled away, only dead and wounded men, women and children were left. Those were the cases of Kim Phuc, Bob Kerry, Mỹ Lai…So Bá let VC mass in the surrounding hills on the edges of the valley and in the valley itself or along the routes. He asked Vann for effective formations of B-52 raiding boxes and bombing up to 500-meter limit from the defensive perimeter. In the box, three B-52s were placed in echelon. That meant the box was divided into three stripes along the box length and each B-52 flew in a stripe. The first bomber flew right along the safety line just outside of the ARVN positions. The second flew in the middle stripe and behind the first. The third came in the outer stripe and behind the second. They all devastated and obliterated anything left in the target zone.
In addition, Bá, Rhotenberry and Hùng worked out all suspected area maps, plans of changing cannon positions, plans of counter-attack and shifting gunners. Bá wanted to save his limited artillery batteries for emergency cases such as the dark foggy nights when the air power couldn’t help much. Ba thought he had to count on what he was in possession of and what he got was limited.

                3. / Heightening South Vietnamese soldiers’ morale
Bá was concerned about his officers’ and soldiers’ morale. He should make and keep it always high. The spirit was the primordial and vital condition of success, a must for every victory. Bá thought the first victory counted. He wanted his brave soldiers to knock down the first coming tank. Indeed, when the news of the burning VC tank spread out, the whole resistant Kontum got so excited that from the division command staff that hugged Bá and Rhotenberry down to soldiers who embraced each other to express their joy. Bá later compared it to a “jack pot” in a casino in Nevada.
When the first VC T-54 tank was shot, its crewmen jumped out of the burning tank and were captured. The captured VC were presented to the ARVN units. Very young, they cried saying that they were high school students. One day, they had been in their classrooms when Molotova trucks came up to the school gates and soldiers jumped out of them, surrounding the school. All students aged 15 and up were rounded up and sent to the South. The presentation of these Bộ Độis showed that VC was not “superior soldiers.”
Like in Tân Cảnh, VC general Thảo wanted to neutralize the division commander, his American advisor and his staff and then to overrun the 23rd ARVN Division. He used tanks to assault the command staff bunker or they fired cannons, especially 130mm cannons to destroy it. Ba had set up a secret second command bunker. Although the first bunker was hit, the ARVN soldiers’ morale got heightened when they heard Colonel Bá’s speech on the public radio. People said that “Bá never dies” and “Good witches protect Bá.”  It was sure that VC commanders fell into a rage.
Andrade’ said that Bá’s personal intervention had been a major factor in the counterattack success.  The idea was partially right. He should have said that Bá was present anywhere at any time when Bá judged he should be there. He knew his presence was necessary for the success because it enhanced his soldiers’ morale and he rectified what seemed wrong.

                4. / Demoralizing Communist commanders and their Bộ Độis:
                Breaking down their “One-prong deep drive” attacking the 23rd ARVN Division Headquarters was crucial. Bá knew this tactic was from the four-star General Văn Tiến Dũng, Hoàng Minh Thảo’s senior superior commander. When Văn Tiến Dũng had been commander of the 42nd VC Regiment in Thái Bình Province in the Hồng Hà Delta, North Vietnam, he took advantage of the darkness of the night and the area, advancing his regiment directly into the French Colonel De Castries’ command staff position. He inflicted heavy casualties to De Castries’ troops. A friend of Ba’s told him that night female French nurses stole away almost naked with only panties and bras (Ba 179).
Bá reasoned that he could not know where Hoàng Minh Thảo’s headquarters were because that shrewd general moved to a new place every single day for his safety. Why should Bá let Thảo know his?  Bá had had a secret second bunker built, 800 meters down South of his bunker #1. He had to survive to beat Thảo and defeat the Easter Offensive in the Highlands. His move to the bunker #2 surprised Vann. 
Bá knew that young Bộ Độis were very scared of fighting. The VC political cadres had to warm their morale up by intimidation and promises. In order to panic them and disperse them out, the best way was to knock off the first coming VC tanks. As a matter of fact, the blazing tank made the terrified crews flee from the hatches, even their captain leader.
Bá managed to place his units in so skillful a stratagem that, when needed, he converged a two-prong counter-attack with the 45th and 53rd Regiments from the outside to strike the back of the VC entrenching in the inner Kontum City or to cut off the enemy spearhead from their main forces.  Furthermore, by surprise, he launched with his reserve task forces of M-41 tanks and infantry a lightning thrust on remnant Bộ Độis dug in the foxholes.
Bá ordered that all secret information was to be transmitted through the American communication system. Sometimes he had some false news sent through ordinary system to trick VC commanders. In brief he wanted his enemies would know nothing about his intention. 

THE BATTLE

SEIZING CHU PAO HILL BY TANKS

Buôn Mê Thout, Pleiku and Kontum on the Highlands were the charming, attracting cities with varied beautiful flower gardens, nice flower-surrounded French-styled villas built by Emperor Bao Dai and Frenchmen, with coffee and tea plantations and hunting areas. They were ideal mountain resorts for honeymooners and vacationers. The residents of these red-soil towns were waiting for the coming of Tết and the spring season with mild weather. Kontum was a small, nice town built on both sides of the Dabla River whose clear water flowed slowly and reflected the azure sky on sunny days and the crescent moon on the starry nights. The streets were planted with Phượng Vĩ trees whose brightly red flowers formed a red cap over the dark green foliages in summer. Vacationers and tourists could watch the pretty white Thai girls serving them cups of delicious newly ground coffee or good smelling freshly picked tea buds. People were living in peace, not expecting the arrival of the “freedom-loving revolutionaries” and afraid of the Hồ chi Minh butchers to bring “Soviet-style totalitarianism to the South Vietnam” (Khachigian, Los Angeles Times). Unfortunately, horrible news came.
On January 15, 1972, at Ba Gi airfield, 12 km northwest of Qui Nhơn City, General Ngô Dzu, MR 2 commander, told the press that the 21st VC Regiment of the 2nd Yellow Star Division had taken the An Lão Valley, north of Qui Nhơn Province. He added that about 60,000 Vietcongs had infiltrated into the MR 2. While VC General Trần Nam Trung gave the order of a strong and widespread attack on the Highlands, the Washington Star issue of April 10, 1972, reported that the last VC division had left North Vietnam to reinforce the 120,000 VC soldiers positioning along the Hồ Chi Minh Trail. 
In the grisly fighting at Firebase 5, the Red-berets found a document from a VC warrant officer’s corpse, named Khổng Thành Hiến. It said that the attack date was on March 13, 1972 and it was signed by VC General Phạm Ngọc Mậu on October 20, 1971. The date on the document was the exact date of the attack day. Khổng Thành Hiến belonged to the Anti-aircraft Battalion of the 64th VC Regiment, the VC 320th “Steel” Division.
On April 14, 1972, Colonel Lý Tòng Bá received General Ngô Dzu’s order to move his 45th and 53rd regiments supported by the 1/8th M-41 Armor Company from southern Buôn Mê Thout to northern Kontum. They were going to be ready to support the 22nd ARVN Division at Tân Cảnh being under the VC pressure. On their way to Kontum, they had to pass by Chu Pao Hill. Chu Pao had an altitude of 3,465 ft and it was at 17 km north of Pleiku. It was like a watchtower controlling the Route 14 connecting Pleiku and Kontum Cities and a large area with dense high trees and hills. A VC battalion stationed on the top of Chu Pao and set up heavy machine guns hindering all passages through the Route 14. The 45th Regiment did not succeed to clear the way because high trees prevented fighter planes from dropping bombs effectively.
After many days of failure, Colonel Bá came up to a Montagnard village near the edge of the Chu Pao Hill where he studied the situation and designed an original, sudden and adventurous plan of attack.  Present at the meeting were Captain Lê Quang Vinh, the commander of the 1/8th M-41 Armor Company and Colonel Nguyễn Văn Chà, the 45th Regiment commander. Pointing to the lumber truck trail on the map, Bá told Vinh to use his tank force and follow the trail to seize by surprise the hilltop. The assault plan with the use of tanks climbing the hill stunned Vinh, he recalled, because it was the first time that there was such an order in the history of tank combat. Vinh said he could have refused executing that mission if that mission order had been given by an officer other than Bá. He knew Bá graduated from Saumur Armor School in France, then Fort Knox Armor School in Kentucky, USA. Bá was also an experienced senior officer of the Armor Branch.
Looking at the hill covered with a dense forest, then at the lumber truck trail, Vinh figured out a plan. Coming back to his unit base, he briefed his men about the attack plan:
=  Sergeant Major Tôn with the Tank 21 opened the way straight to the objective and reached it as fast as possible.
=  Captain Vinh with the Command Tank followed the Tank 21. Arriving at the hilltop, his tank turned northwest to protect the Tank 21’s flank.
=  Tank 11 followed the Command Tank. Reaching the hilltop, it turned east and went through Saddle Pass to control that area.               
=  Lieutenant Chinh’s Tank was ready for reinforcement, when ordered.
=  Second Lieutenant Chi with Tank 34 went through the Saddle Pass, then turned east opening the controlled area and with Tank 11 pushing the enemies downhill.
=  A company of the 4th Battalion, the 45th Regiment, commanded by Captain Cẩm, escorted the tanks and was ready for a hand-to-hand combat
=  The rest of the company’s tanks, commanded by Captain Hào, stationed along the edge of the forest, at the southern side of the Route 14. With the cannon barrels pointing to the target, they carpeted the hilltop fiercely to paralyze the VC resistance while the spearhead tanks were climbing the hill slope. Hào could move the tanks to different places to trick the enemies.

It was twelve noon when the Tank 21 pulled away into the Route 14, followed by other tanks. The armored soldiers’ spirit was very high because Vinh and his soldiers were willing to prove the tank capacity of combat in the mountains. They believed the original initiative would succeed. Unfortunately a natural obstacle took place. Facing the Chu Pao Hill and on the other side of the Route 14 was a smaller Chu Thới Hill. To keep the absolute secrecy of the operation, tanks had to roll along the eastern side of Chu Thoi Hill where they plunged into a large muddy wetland. Vinh had to spend hours and sweat utilizing M-113s to pull M-41s across that marsh. At last all tanks came to the staging area. It was then almost 3:00 p.m.
As soon as the spearhead tank crossed the Route 14, Hào’s supporting tanks began pounding the target. Vinh’s tank followed right behind the Tank 21. All the tanks disappeared one by one into the dense forest. Vinh recalled that his mind was so tense that he forgot everything in this world, his beloved wife and his dear children. He only saw the coming pictures of the bloody, deadly fighting with horrible explosions around his tank and his comrades in arms’.
At the first sight, the lumber truck trail appeared rather neat on the map and he thought that it would look like the road on which his tanks were rumbling ahead. He did not remember that the trail had not been in use for years. Branches, leaves and tall grass covered the path almost completely. It was extremely hard for the first tank driver to discern where the trail lay ahead. In addition, the trail was narrow, twisted and full of holes and dips. Had there been any tank mine explosion or had any tank driver carelessly lurched either to the right or to the left, it was no doubt that the tank would have tumbled down into the ravines. Captain Vinh’s tank had to roll exactly on the traces left by the first tank treads. Looking back at the following tanks, he had the picture of a horde of metal elephants moving slowly uphill. The 500 meter-long lumber truck trail seemed to prolong unlimitedly. The 10-minute time, to last for hours. 
Ten minutes later, the Saddle Pass came into sight gradually, a narrow valley connecting two small hills on which two .75mm recoilless cannons controlled the Route 14 below. “Target’s in the direction of 12 hours, at 50 meters! Fire!” Tồn shouted from the Tank 21. Right away all weapons poured fire upon the target. When Vinh was at 10 meters from the hilltop, he heard two big explosions on the direction of 3 hours. Black smoke gushed from the Tank 21. The tank was hit while it was running over a series of VC bunkers.
“Let me deal with the right!” Vinh yelled. Ten seconds later, his tank knocked off the .75mm recoilless cannon, the weapon that had fired the Tank 21. Standing on the Saddle Pass, he said that he was going to rescue the Tank 21’s team and that the Tanks 11 and 34 crossed the Saddle Pass, then opened the controlled area. All cannons and machine-guns poured bullets and shells upon enemies who fled away. On the Pass VCs’ bunkers being destroyed, Bộ Độis got out of their A-shaped foxholes and ran for their lives while shooting B-40s or throwing hand grenades to Vinh’s tank. Fortunately, grenades fell down to the ground and exploded. 
“Watch out! The aerial observer L-19 plane says VCs are right beside your tank tracks,” (caterpillar treads) Colonel Bá said. But it was too late. Vinh heard a loud explosion under his tank. The tank gunner got hurt, his blood puffing out of his mouth. Pulling the injured down to the tank floor, Vinh quickly grasped the 50mm machine gun and fired at suspected hiding places. Supporting infantrymen knocked out other recoilless cannons, chased and killed VCs fleeing down hill.
Nearly one hour later, the last VC escapees disappeared into the northern hillside forests. Vinh’s unit got two .75mm recoilless cannons and 15 other guns. Chu Pao Hill was cleared of VCs. One of his tanks was damaged and 4 soldiers were wounded. He felt sorry because he lost some comrades in arms.
Vinh reported the victory to Colonel Bá. He then took his company to Pleiku for refuel and repair. Later his armor company came to Kontum. The Route 14 was through and the 23rd ARVN Division moved on to Kontum without any obstacle (Vinh’s documents).

THE KONTUM BATTLE:

Phase one (14 – 17 May 1972
Colonel Bá had to win the battle. He had not suffered any defeat so far. His great concern was the emplacement of the regiments. He knew the combat capacity of each regiment and its commanding officers. He was also aware that he would not have any soldier reinforcements during the battle and his division was going to fight against three VC divisions. That meant that one of his men had to kill three VCs to survive. Bá got an armor company of 10 M-41 tanks. Captain Vinh, the company commander was a fearless and professional officer. He would utilize his tanks to protect the division headquarters and to root out all VCs hiding in foxholes. Bá’s problem was to figure out a plan and a schedule to save more soldiers and kill more enemies. 
B-52s were effective when the enemies were far outside the perimeter of defense. He was aware of the strict rules B-52s had to obey:
*  There would be no B-52 bomber flight if the map showed the target had Montagnard houses or villages or routes and bridges.
*  If there were allies’ suspected forces in action or fleeing survivors, B-52s would not come.
*  The procedure requesting B-52 flight was complicated. It took 24 hours from the application deposit time to the coming time of the bombers.
*  The safety range of the B-52 bombing was 5/8 of a mile from the friendly positions.

VC commanders knew those conditions and they found tricks to elude the bomb rain. On the contrary, Bá tried to deceive those VC tricks. He withdrew his men from remote positions to Kontum center, leaving large areas for free firing and bombing. He called those areas the killing grounds. Gathering on their staging areas, VCs were the good prey for the B-52s.
VC used to hug the ARVN belt to avoid B-52 bomb rain. Bá requested that the safety bombing range be shortened to 500 yards from the defense perimeter. Because his guess of the assault time on the Hill 501 was exact, B-52s came right on time when VC soldiers were massing outside the defense perimeter. They broke the enemies’ main forces.
Bá knew that during the months of May and June the mist was very dense at night and VC soldiers took advantage of that thick night haze to crawl into the defense perimeter for a surprised attack. In that case, B-52s became ineffective. The ARVN soldiers and Bộ Độis would be in “the leopard hide” position and there would be a hand-to-hand combat. Bá needed a strong reserve and a well-thought counter-attack plan. Davidson wrote without critical thinking, “Things were now desperate for Bá. Kontum was cut off, its defenses penetrated. The only hope left now was two pre-planned B-52 strikes. At the last moment ARVN troops in the target area were withdrawn, and on the prescribed minute the bombs hit the attackers,” (Davidson 692).  He continued, “That night another NVA penetration was barely beaten off with the help of a B-52 strike” (Davidson 693). How and where could B-52 pilots drop bombs? On the ARVN’s, VC’s and civilian residents’ heads in the inner Kontum City? George Donelson Moss wrote, “Only round-the-clock bombing by cells of B-52s finally broke the NVA assault, enabling Bá’s battered 23rd Division to clear the city. American air power, especially the intensive B-52 attacks, had saved Kontum City” (Moss 380). Why hadn’t American air power, especially the B-52 attacks, saved Tân Cảnh – Dak Tô battle and others? That was strange. That was nonsense.
Bá was going to design a defensive shape. He thought that the point of appui defense plan in Dien Bien Phu had been vulnerable and he rejected that formation. He preferred the perimeter defense. The three regiments of the 23rd ARVN Division and the Regional and Popular forces of the Kontum province would form a steel circumference around the City. The center of defense would be the 23rd Division Command Post, supported by the reserve task forces composed of infantry, artillery, and tanks.
Examining the map of the Kontum City, Bá and Rhotenberry saw the Hill 501, about 2 miles away, in the North of Kontum City. Their exact guess was that VC General Thao would conquer at any cost that hill on which he would set up cannons to hammer the city. To Bá and Rhotenberry, the first victory would be very important and vital. The first shot counted. The soldiers in the MR 2 had been haunted by the VC T-54 and T-59 tanks. Bá wanted by any means to raise the ARVN soldiers’ spirit. Bá told his men that the ARVN forces had M-72, XM 202 and TOWs ready to destroy VC tanks, that they were the battle-seasoned soldiers, and that they had to step on scared VC soldiers’ heads to win.
Therefore Bá emplaced the “see and win” 44th Regiment on that hill 501. Lieutenant Colonel Tiến, the 44th Regiment commander, positioned the brave soldiers around his staff bunker to destroy any coming VC tanks. The 44th Regiment also protected the western side of the City, down to the Dabla River. The 45th Regiment commanded by Colonel Chà was responsible of the northern side and the 53rd Regiment protected the eastern side of the City, down to the Dabla River. The protection of the southern side of Kontum was assigned to the Popular and Regional forces that took position on both riverbanks. Colonel Nguyễn Bá Thinh, province chief, was in charge of that southern arc of defense. Supported by an infantry battalion from the 44th Regiment, the armor company was to protect the 23rd ARVN Division Headquarters.  All commanders were advised that they manage to knock off the first coming VC tanks to enhance the soldiers’ morale and secure the victory. All communication had to be short like “Done or ready.”
Ba and Rhotenberry saw to that the night airlift of the 44th Regiment to Kontum went on perfectly.  Lt. Colonel Tiến reported that the last squad was in a ready-to-combat position on May 14. Ba felt relieved and content. Now the whole City was waiting for Bo Dois to show up like the hunters, for the deer to come out.

But on what day and at what time?
Bá and Rhotenberry did not want his soldiers to be surprised at the assault. Bá sent out small reconnaissance patrols roaming about as far as they could to look for the enemy movements. Bá was eager to know where VC soldiers crowded, how large the buildup was, on what day and at what time the attack was going to be. 
Lt. Colonel Lữ Phụng, the 2nd Bureau chief, rushed into the division command bunker and handed Bá an important piece of decoded information. It said, “5:00 a.m. North Vietnam time…assault…” Ba felt contented, but what day was the “N” day? He pondered. Rhotenberry had the same idea. “N” meant attack.  Ba had the time “5:00 am… assault”, but he did not know the “N” day. He doubted that this information might be a trick. After days of waiting for the attack, Bá, his officers and soldiers are tired and impatient.  However this incomplete information heightened their morale. Bá and Rhotenberry visited every unit, talked and laughed with them, and helped them solve their problems. Bá and his soldiers did not feel any gap between them. They treated each other in the military brotherhood. Captain Vinh, the armor company commander, said he had served many senior officers and Bá was the best senior officer. Extremely calm and brave, he was never arrogant and angry with his subalterns or soldiers. He advised them, told them what they should do, discerning the right way from the wrong one. That was why Bá wanted his three regiments of the 23rd ARVN Division for the defense of Kontum because he knew every officer’s names and trusted them, and they knew and trusted him. The victory came from the soldiers’ morale, the “live-and-die together” determination.
Then another news confirmed by “SPAR” (intelligence service) informed the exact position of VC General Hoàng Minh Thảo’s command staff. The location was only about 8 km north of the City. Usually the VC commander and his staff were about 20 or 30 km north of Kontum. Suddenly, VC Gen. Thảo moved his staff too close to the 23rd Division Headquarters. Bá concluded that VC attack would start on May 15, 1972 at 5:00 am. The reason was that VC General Thảo never stayed at any place more than one day. He ordered that all units’ commanders be ready for combat, especially the 2nd Bureau chief, the 3rd Bureau chief and the artillery commander. All communication had to be kept strictly secret and transmitted through American system. The daily communication system was used to transmit false information to trick the enemies. Bá said that his division was ready two hours before the assault. He waited for the prey to come out and the attack would develop as he expected. And it did.

When the guessed time came, Lt. Colonel Tiến, the 44th Regiment commander reported two lighted “cat” eyes coming near. Right away, the 1/44th Battalion commander shouted happily, “We’ve hit!  One tank’s knocked off.” The shout spread through the division communication system. The shout electrified the soldiers’ morale. The prey was caught. People could sense the joy engulfed the whole City, soldiers as well as civil residents. In the division command bunker, the staff officers rushed hugging Ba and they embraced each other yelling, “We’ve won!” What Bá had expected came. The 320th VC Division tanks led the way directly to the 44th Regiment command bunker. They were rolling in one straight line, supported by infantrymen. When the first VC tank was destroyed, the ARVN artillery hammered VCs with burst-on-target bullets for tanks and for VC mass, and hovered-action shells. In 60 minutes, the division artillery had blanketed with 2000 rounds the northern area forward of the Hill 501 where Bộ Đội massed for the assault. B-52s rained bombs on them. The 320th VC Division suffered heavy casualties. VC bodies lay strewn about with their weapons. “Uncle Ho” saddles and pieces of the “withering grass” green uniforms hung with cut and bloody arms or legs on the trees that snapped, torn down or rooted up. The ground was dug up, full of five-foot-deep pits and 20-foot-wide craters. Howitzers and rockets and rocket launchers lay beside their dead gunners. Four T-54 and T-59 were destroyed and more than 300 “born in the North, dead in the South” were left on the battlefield (Bá’s letters).  
General Nguyễn Văn Toàn was very happy about the victory because he got the gift just after less than two week of his take over. He obtained what he needed badly to regain President Nguyễn văn Thiệu’s credibility. John Paul Vann expressed his joy over and over, saying, “Bá, you’re a brave and professional soldier.” Bá replied, “I’ve done what I had promised. This victory is for you. It’s the fruit of your work” (Bá 176).
The defense line around the Hill 501 stood still as a rock. VC General Hoàng Minh Thảo’s target and tactic failed bitterly. Bá and Rhotenberry pondered where, when and how Thảo was going to attack next. 

Phase two (May 18, 1972 - July 1972) (see map):
Bá was certain that Thảo was going to neutralize him, Rhotenberry and his staff. Thảo was going to kill the snake by cutting its head. He could spot the ARVN division command bunker on the map. First he had his artillery pound Bá’s bunker thousands of bullets; then his T-54 and T-59 tanks directly assaulted the 23rd Division command bunker. Bá thought that since he could not know Thao’s position, why he let Thảo know his. Secretly, Bá had had the Engineering unit build a second and alternative bunker, called bunker # 2, some 800 meters south of the bunker # 1. Bá knew that the bunker #1, built by RMK-BRJ constructors, was very strong and secure, but not secret. However the bunker #2, built with burlap bags of sand, was relatively solid, but very secret. Bá and Rhotenberry moved to bunker #2. Vann was surprised about Bá’s decision. He did not understand Bá’s reasoning. Vann was American and Bá, Vietnamese.  Their thinking was different in front of an event. Bá and Thảo were Vietnamese and their reasoning was similar. Bá had to conceive tricks to deceive Thảo’s tactics. Vann told Bá later that one colonel suggested to Vann that Colonel Nguyễn Bá Thịnh should take over Bá because Bá had intended to desert from his post when he moved to the bunker #2. Vann did not agree. He told Bá, “I trust you.” Bá replied, “John, don’t worry. Either I die or I’m captured as prisoner of war or you and I will win.”
The next thing Bá had to do was to move 45th Regiment up to the Hill 501 and pulled the 44th Regiment back to the defense center for a respite. The 44th Regiment soldiers secretly stole among thick forest to come back to the City. The regiment command staff stationed in the bunker #1. After VC General Thảo had tasted the first bitter defeat, he had his political cadres boost his Bộ Độis’ morale about the coming Hồ chi Minh’s birthday. 

The Northwest Assault

                Throughout the 16th and 17th of May 1972, the VC were pounding Kontum City like rain.  Mortars, cannon shells, 130-mm cannon bullets, and rockets hurled on the 23rd ARVN Division Command compound, the City Hall, the Regional and Popular Forces Headquarters, the City housing and business area. The fierce and savage shelling made the entire city activities stop short. It was very misty and dark in the early hours of May 18, 1972. Profiting from the thick darkness, five VC tanks led the way and the 320th VC Division invaded the graveyard where the 44th and the 53rd Regiments failed to coordinate interlocking fire. They rolled between the 2nd Field Hospital and Ngoc Hoi camp. They advanced straight to the 44th ARVN Regiment command bunker. They intended to destroy the 23rd Division Headquarters. That was the “One-prong deep drive” tactic neutralizing Bá and Rhotenberry. But they met the 44th Regiment’s victorious soldiers, instead. For Bá had moved his staff to the bunker #2. At 50 meters from the bunker, an officer and his men fired XM 202s at the coming tanks. XM 202s were not the anti-tank weapons. They were used against mass attack. But panicked, the crews of these tanks poured from the opened hatches.  They were burned by the phosphorus flame. The soldiers captured the intact tanks. The Bộ Độis supporting the tanks fled away. However the following 320th VC Division soldiers lay down holding ground they had gained. They occupied almost half the city, including the 2nd Field Hospital, Ngọc Hồi Rear Base of the 22nd ARVN Division Armor Regiment, and the ammunition, fuel and food supply Camp. Ba recalled he was very worried that Bộ Đội would carry those supplies away or they would burn them out (see map).

The captain commander of the VC tank unit was among the dead. In his logbook he wrote he had led his tank unit directly to the 22nd ARVN Division Headquarters bunker and destroyed it at Tan Canh.  Colonel Lê Đức Đạt and his staff were scattered. And the VCs easily defeated the 22nd ARVN Division.   Now in Kontum the VCs replayed the same tactics; but Bá had known it. He had prepared tricks to destroy them. Bá wasn’t there in the bunker. VC General Thảo failed his attempt when he heard Bá’s voice from the public speakers. The officer who knocked off the first coming VC tank was Lê Xuân Nhi living now in the United States. In the article Drifting with the Country Destiny, Lê Xuân Nhi said that he was one of the soldiers who had gunned down the first tanks breaching the defense line of Kontum. These fearless fighting men were waiting for the VC tanks to come very near at point-blank range. Therefore they could not miss any tank. In front of the 44th Regiment command bunker, four T-54 and T-59 tanks were captured intact.  Bá wondered why they did not fire any bullet. 
Bá was cautious, waiting for the daylight and examining the situation carefully. The ARVN soldiers were interlacing with Bộ Độis in the “panther hide” position. He designed a counter-attack plan of  the “two-prong counter-attack” tactics with the tank company support. Secretly he told Colonel Chà, the 45th Regiment commander to leave the Hill 501, bringing his men back to the defense center. The 45th Regiment skulked through the forest, making a southbound curve to enter Kontum center. 

The Fight in the Kontum Cemetery (See map)
The northern section of the defense, guarded by two battalions of the 45th Regiment, spread along the south bank of the stream and on the edge of the Kontum City Cemetery. On the North of the stream, there was a little hill with sparse trees. Hammered by a heavy shelling of the .75-mm Recoilless cannons from that hill to the south side of the stream, the two battalions had to withdraw after two hours’ fighting.  They retreated into the City Cemetery. Their trenches and foxholes were occupied by the Communists. 
Early in the morning, Colonel Bá directly ordered Captain Lê Quang Vinh, the commander of 1/8th Armor Company, to retake the lost section of defense. Vinh and his staff stole among tombs to reach the 3/45th Battalion Commanding post, stationing behind a big tomb. Vinh guessed that the distance from where he stood to the VC’s trench line was about 200 yards.  The difficulty for the tanks was that the tanks could not attack by horizontal line formation because of high tombs. So the tanks had to move forward, snaking among tombs. Unfortunately the cemetery was clear and recoilless cannon snipers from the hill on the other side of the stream could easily spot tanks in the cemetery. 
Coming back to the sawmill, used as the Armor Company commanding post, Vinh, his subaltern officers and noncom tank gunners discussed the attack plan.  Following was the plan:

• Two armor platoons led the spearhead attack front, firing while advancing
• One reserve platoon protected the left front, firing and advancing
• Artillery observer officers asked for artillery support by pounding the hill to neutralize VC .75-mm Recoilless cannons while tanks were advancing.

At the departure time, the 2nd and 3rd armor platoons were moving forward, winding among tombs while firing at the enemy trenches and foxholes. Artillery pieces continually poured bullets on the hill. Unfortunately, when the tanks came to a clear ground, artillery batteries stopped shelling. No one knew why. The artillery observer officers vehemently shouted in their communication combinations, asking to continue the shelling. At this time, when the artillery bombard stopped, the .75-mm cannons started raining bullets immediately from the hill and VC soldiers stood up from their trenches and foxholes and fired B-40 and B-41 at the tanks. Some tanks were hit and the attack formation was broken.
Vinh ordered the reserve armor platoon and the commanding platoon to move ahead and fire at the hill to neutralize the .75-mm cannons. The six tanks that were left from the spearhead platoons dashed ahead, firing to the enemy trenches. One tank was hit and stopped at 50 yards from the VC positions. A ferocious fight between tanks and two VC battalions developed, grenades being the best weapon. Soldiers threw grenades from the tanks to their hiding places, VC hurling theirs back to the tanks, the quickest men survived.
Sergeant Bảo’s tank at the right turned horizontal, rolling along the trench openings, its cannon barrel muzzle lowered down shooting without stop at the VC. Ten minutes later the infantrymen reached the VC line and wiped out the last “born in the North, dead in the South” Bộ Đội. At noon, the 44th and the 45th Regiments retook the 2nd Field Hospital, Ngoc Hoi Camp, and logistic storage. The enemies left behind 400 bodies.

The Fight in the Area forward of the northern defense perimeter
The following afternoon, one battalion of the 45th Regiment, supported by the 1/ 8th M-41 Armor Company were pinned down by strong VC forces in the area forward of the northern defense perimeter.  VC forces were holding ground in the woods and small hills. Until late in the afternoon, the ARVN soldiers could not overrun the enemies because of the bickering between the tank company commander and the infantry battalion’s. The infantry battalion commander accused the tank company commander of not going forward while the second commander blamed the first for not protecting the advancing tanks in a hand-to-hand combat. To settle their dispute, Bá himself commanded the assault. He ordered, “The tank company advances and the infantry battalion escorts the tanks to protect them. Arriving at the target, both must overrun it.”
The combined forces went forward, slashing at VCs in their foxholes. Accompanied with M-41 tanks whose cannon barrels lowered close to the ground, the infantrymen advanced courageously, firing and killing the escaping VCs. The enemies fled away, leaving behind hundreds of dead and weapons. Their victory was quick and glorious. However Bá felt very sorry that he lost some tank platoon leaders because their M-41 tanks were hit by VC anti-tank AT-3s. One distinguished Division Reconnaissance Company captain got wounded by a bullet hurting his vertebral column. Paralyzed, he could not stand up or walk (Bá’s letter).
Bá recalled an incident that was interesting, but it denoted the difference between the American and Vietnamese officers’ way of thinking. While Bá was commanding the counter-attack, a helicopter landed and General Hill got out of it to meet Bá.  Hill complained that Bá gave order of counter-attack too late and that he should have done it right away in the night. Bá replied, “Between Late and Right away, which one surely guarantees the victory. I chose Late.” He argued that if he had given the order of counter-attack right in the night and if one of the M-41 tanks had been hit by a B-40, how the consequence would have been and how much the soldiers’ morale would have been affected. Since the darkness of the night was thick, how could the tank gunners coordinate with their supporting infantrymen? How could the ARVN soldiers distinguish their comrades in arms from VCs because there was no light and no signs?  Bá could not see a victory in a night combat without light, moon and stars. Besides, the 45th Regiment was composed of 90 % of Montagnards who were not educated and militarily trained well enough to understand the orders and carry them out properly. What Bá explained made sense to Hill who asked the last question.  If the 44th Regiment command bunker had been knocked off, what would Ba have reacted? Bá answered that it was what Hill presumed, but indeed the bunker had been intact so far. He then invited Hill to come back later in the day to see another victory. And the victorious event took place as Bá had said.
Later Vann flew to Kontum and Ba reported him exactly what he had spoken to Hill. Before Vann left, he patted Bá on his shoulder, whispering that General Hill would return to the US in a few days in the last American troop withdrawal from Vietnam. Bá and Vann were very pleased to see Kontum stood, cleared of enemies.

                The Eastern Assault
                But Kontum’s calmness did not last long. Two major defeats in the northern side of Kontum City drove General Hoàng Minh Thảo mad at the 320th VC Division, scattered and torn into pieces. He looked at the eastern and southern sides of the city because he wrongly undermined the combat spirit of the Regional and Popular forces. On May 25, 1972 profiting from the darkness of the night, the D-400 VC Special Mission forces led the way, invading the eastern side of the City, followed by the 2nd VC “Yellow Star” Division. They seized the business sector in the East Side of the City. They positioned in the street houses and stores. There would be an imminent street combat.

The Southern Assault
In the southern side and along the Dabla River another VC regiment struggled to conquer Phuong Nghĩa Village where they thought they could overrun the Regional and Popular Forces. But they met a sudden fierce resistance, curtailing their advance, lashing them with stormy blows of fire and hurling them back to the forest (see map). Andrade wrote, “Although the quality of the Ruff-Puffs in the area was generally poor, some did respond well, engaging the superior North Vietnamese forces in fierce firefights.” He made an erroneous judgement because there was a contradiction of ideas. The enemy forces were about a regiment. How could “some [Ruff-Puffs] do respond well,…[containing] the penetration of [a VC regiment] into the city’s southern sector…?” (Andrade 338).

The Eastern Counter-attack
                Bá quickly figured out a counter-attack. He dispatched a battalion of the 45th Regiment to reinforce the south campaign, ready to extinguish any further VC ambition. The 53rd Regiment on the northeast area had the order to punch down south and cut the enemies in two, separating the VC dug in the city from the rest of their forces that milled about outside the City like attracting preys for the B-52 bombing. From the inner resistance, Ba sent forth in turns every battalion of the 44th, 45th and 53rd Regiments with the support of the 1/8th Tank Company to wipe out VCs in a melee combat from house to house, from street to street and finally from the City of Kontum. 
Especially Bá recalled the fighting in the area next to the City Church and the mansion in which the French Bishop Sheizt was present at that time. A great number of VCs and their staffs were hiding in a big solid concrete chapel. They fortified it so strongly that it turned out to be a blockhouse. After many costly failed attempts to clear the enemies out of the chapel, Ba requested Vann to use TOW to knock it off.  But Vann refused to do so, saying that TOW was an anti-tank weapon and it could not be used to fire at VC infantry. That was against the military rules. Bá’s arguments were that fortified deadly house could be considered a “stationary tank” in this case under the view of the tactic situation. The 23rd ARVN Division had sacrificed almost a company for that target. His division was besieged thickly by Vietcongs. He did not expect any future reinforcements of men and tanks. So Bá had to save soldiers’ lives while he could not predict how long this battle would last. Moreover, Bá did not have enough tanks left to spread out all over the City and the M-41 tank cannon was not strong enough to blast that blockhouse. At last Vann gave in.  The TOW team led by Lt. Colonel Bill Bricker came, saw the blockhouse, and smoke gushed out of the house that became silent. VCs paid their crimes by one round of TOW. In A Bright Shinning Lie, Sheehan made up a false information when he wrote, “One tank crew backed its behemoth into a house to try to hide. The TOW team got the tank by shooting a missile through a window” (Sheehan 782).  There was no VC tank in that chapel (Bá’s letter). The VC remnants, who left the business sector of Kontum, made for a village in the eastern outskirts of the City. The VNAF A-6 jet fighters raided them. The fighting did not last long because the 53rd Regiment finished them quickly.

                The 1/8th Armor Company
It would be a very big mistake if this book did not praise the high combat spirit of the 1/8th Tank Company whose commander was a superb captain Lê Quang Vinh. He showed his shining bravery and his excellent profession performance during the Kontum Battle. His tank company “came, saw and won” the battle (Veni, vidi, vici). Like a thunder, his tanks conquered Chu Pao Hill on their way to Kontum. They wiped out the 320th VC Division soldiers from the City Cemetery and from the north area forward the defense perimeter before nightfall. They lashed out bullets into the VC strongholds in the business sector of the City. The Bộ Độis died or were captured anywhere they came.  At first the 1/8th Tank Company had 10 M-41s. Three of them were hit. They got left 7, then down to 3. But the repair team struggled to fix them day and night. Dismounting the destroyed tanks, they took the needed parts to mend the broken down ones. These magic tank mechanics did the wonderful work. Finally the armor company got six good pieces to chase the VC out of the Kontum City. They were amazing armor soldiers, determined to win the war.

                The Vietnam Air Forces (VNAF)
                Bá also recalled the air show of VNAF (Vietnam Air Forces) over Kontum sky. That was not an air show in El Toro, California for the American spectators. But it was a really fighting air show between air-ground missiles and SA-7 anti-aircraft weapons. The heroic pilots swooped down, firing rockets or dropping bombs into the deep anti-aircraft foxholes, then they pulled back the stick and their jet planes climbed straight up, swirling into the blue sky. The South Vietnam Air Forces AC-47 Spooky gunships churned out thousands of rounds, spewing lead down on the hapless VCs. A-IE Skyraider jockeys and A-6 jet fighters sprinted over houses and stores in the business district, firing rockets or dropping bombs to dislodge VCs. Looking at the jet fighters passing overhead, Ba praised them and appreciated their high performance and their brilliant bravery. The infantrymen felt their combat morale got heightened. The strapped VCs in the business district of the City did not see any way out. They were exterminated either by soldiers or by tanks or by aircraft bombing. These poor “born in the North, dead in the South” Bộ Đội were real victims of Communist Hồ Chi Minh. They died this year. But two or three years later, the unfortunate parents or wives would be informed of their sons’ or husbands’ tragic death while the body remains had been decayed into dirt and ashes. They did not even know where and how their sons’ or husbands’ bodies had been buried. 

                Kontum City and Its Residents

                The 23rd ARVN Division and City residents were living under the continuous explosions of 101-mm, 102-mm rockets and 122-mm cannon shells. The VC failed to use tanks in the assault of the 44th Regiment command bunker in which they thought Bá was commanding. They concentrated the shelling around the bunker #1. Later, discovering Ba’s bunker #2, they destroyed all houses around it. But Bá’s bunker was intact. People said that good witches protected Bá. The enemies were shrewd in moving cannons and rockets about and mingling rocket and cannon firings so that Colonel Hùng, the artillery commander could not spot their positions for the retaliation.  But Hùng was too smart to be tricked. At any case he succeeded to find VC artillery positions. He silenced them either by his artillery or B-52 bombing on the hilltops surrounding the City. The 130mm cannons were terrifying weapons. Their position was very far from the City. Nobody could hear the starting firing sound. But as soon as their bullet’s scary flying scream was heard, the explosion came instantly. Once a 130mm cannon shell hit the command bunker, causing some dead and some wounded. Major Dũng, MD and his medics did a good job, bandaging the wounded and running back and forth under the shelling to the Field Hospital to get medicaments. Major Dũng, MD and his nurses were heroic, tending the wounded day and night during the terrible battle.

Round the clock, clouds of smoke, dust and dirt were covering the whole City. The ceaseless shell pounding shook loose the brains of the people in the City and drove them mad. In the bunkers the air was so polluted that soldiers as well as officers got suffocated. But when they got on the ground, the air they breathed in was contaminated with rotten body stink, dust, explosive and fuel smoke. During 40 days soldiers and civilians were eating canned food. Usually it gave them delicious taste, but now it tasted like rotten wood. They were hungry of fresh vegetables, fruit, meat and fish. Usually dogs roamed in the streets, in the markets and near the restaurants. Now no dog was seen there. They took refuge in the soldiers’ trenches. Many of them with different colors stuck around in Bá’s and Rhotenberry’s bunker. Pointing to them, Rhotenberry joked with Bá, “Bá, live C-ration.”  And both laughed (Bá 171)
The City of Kontum wore a macabre aspect. Military camps and civilian houses burned, gushing forth black smoke. Rows of houses, shops and stores were demolished with furniture, housewares and clothing scattered everywhere. Beautiful trees bordering the streets were cut off, branches and leaves withering on the ground. Charming neon signs, street lampposts and electric wire were torn down, strewn on the sidewalks. The clear water of the beautiful Dabla River became polluted with trash, human and animal corpses. People in the South Vietnam, especially in the Kontum City did not want the war. They wanted to live peacefully in their beautiful mountain town. But the Communist leaders brought death, sufferings and devastation to the South Vietnamese, the trees and the town structures that generations and generations of Vietnamese had built.

President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s visit
On May 30, 1972 Kontum City was still hearing some distant cannon explosions and smelling the enemy corpses’ stink and explosive unpleasant odor, Vann showed President Nguyễn văn Thiệu the devastated City. In the Division command bunker, President Thiệu pinned the Victory Stars on Colonel Bá’s collar. Once more, Bá got promotion on the battlefield. In 1961-1963 he obtained promotions when he commanded the 7th M-113 Armor Company, then the 6th Tank Battalion in the Tháp Mười Marsh. In 1968 he got Colonel stripes with the American Silver Star Medal in Binh Duong Province. Vann was present at those three special occasions. The City of Kontum held bravely. The victory puzzled Saigon and Washington because one ARVN Division had beaten three VC Divisions. The Vietnamese Government, the American Government and the American and Vietnamese delegations in the Paris Conference felt relieved while Võ Nguyên Giáp tasted the bitterness of the big defeat. Exterminated, the entire 2nd VC “Yellow Star” Division disappeared from the North Vietnam Army, (the 2nd VC Division’s remnants being assimilated to the 3rd VC “Yellow Star” Division).  The 200,000 VC, 200 Soviet-made T-54 and Chinese-made T-59 tanks, and a great number of advanced Soviet weapons crumbled and scattered like dead leaves along Hồ Chi Minh trail. Four-star General Võ Nguyên Giáp was then replaced by Gen. Văn Tiến Dũng, his subaltern.
More than 1076 “born in the North, dead in the South” corpses had to be buried in common tombs. The 23rd ARVN Division captured 35 prisoners of war, 8 VCs granted asylum under the Open Arm policy, 480 crew-served weapons, the advanced ones, newly shipped from the Soviet Union to Vietnam, and 900 small arms. Six T-54 tanks were captured intact and four were destroyed (Bá documents).  Every soldier and officer of the 23rd ARVN Division got promotions. The 23rd ARVN Division got VN$8 million rewards. But there remained a big regret: the beautiful City of Kontum no longer existed.

The Kontum battle was over. The 23rd ARVN Division and Bá were the winners. However while they were enjoying the victory, they could not forget the loss of the experienced and courageous officers, their fallen comrades in arms. The coming of the night was always scary because it brought death, sufferings and destruction even though the calm had come back to Kontum. Every day Bá and Rhotenberry were happy to wait for Vann’s arrival to see each other, to joke and to laugh. The daily meeting meant to each of them very much because they had experienced the bitterness of the Tân Cảnh defeat, the anxiety of the Kontum battle outcome, the hardship during the fighting, and now the glory of the victory. Night came slowly. Ba and Rhotenberry were waiting for Vann who would fly back from Saigon with an open bottle of Champagne. It was very late in the night. But Vann didn’t arrive yet. Bá felt restless, then afraid to hear the news: Vann wouldn’t come forever. He wouldn’t say good-bye to Bá. That was the fate of “brave and professional soldiers” who flocked together, fought together and never saw each other again to say farewell. It was also the destiny of the comrades in arms who never came back and of the ones who were still alive keeping unforgettable memories of those who wouldn’t come back. The South Vietnamese did not want the war, but it came. The South Vietnamese did not want to die, but the death came. The South Vietnamese did not like to suffer, but the sufferings approached. The South Vietnamese did not want to be insulted, but the pro-Vietcong war activists in the world over did insult them. Where was the Homosapiens’ wisdom? The aggressors were praised and the war victims, blamed. Hear, O God Almighty! Where was the justice?

Below is the biography of General Lý Tòng Bá

ANALYSIS OF THE KONTUM VICTORY 

BALANCE OF FORCES:

                Vietcong Forces:
                Võ Nguyên Giáp moved 35,000 Vietcongs, tanks and armored personnel carriers and advanced weapons “for an attack on Dak Tô in the Central Highlands with the objective of taking Kontum” (Olson and Roberts 245). The Vietcong forces were composed of the 2nd VC “Yellow Star” Division, the 320th VC “Steel” Division and the 10th VC Division. They were supported by an artillery regiment composing 101-mm and 102-mm Rockets, 102-mm cannons and long-rang 130-mm artillery. For the first time they were escorted by the 303rd Tank Regiment composed of 40 tanks. But Bá thought there were only more than ten M-54 and M-59 tanks (Bá’s letters). Neil Sheehan wrote “the ten or so T-54s that remained of the forty that had come from the North” (Sheehan 783). They had B-40, B-41, SA-7 anti-aircrafts, and AT-3 anti-tank weapons (known as Sagger) the state-of-the-art Soviet technology. General Hoàng Minh Thảo, Battlefield Commander and General Phạm Ngọc Mậu, Battle Zone 3 Commander were responsible for the Highlands campaign. 

South Vietnam Forces (ARVN):
The ARVN forces consisted mainly of the 44th, 45th and 53rd Regiments of the 23rd ARVN Division, Kontum Province’s Regional and Popular forces, B-52s, VN Air Forces stationing in Pleiku, and the Artillery Regiment of the 23rd Division. Bá had only 10 M-41 tanks of the 1/8th Tank Company. They had LAWs and TOWs anti-tank guns. The defense commander was Colonel Lý Tòng Bá with American Advisors: John Paul Vann, General Hill and Colonel Rhotenberry.

Comparison between Communist and Republic Forces:
                The 23rd ARVN Division fought against three victorious VC Divisions. The Communist forces  outnumbered the Free Vietnamese forces 3 by 1. VC state-of-the-art weapons were light and deadlier with B-40s, B-41s, AT-3 and SA-7 in the city combat. The long-range 130-mm cannons were horrifying because their positions were very far from the target.     Soldiers did not have time to seek cover when their flying sound was heard and their destruction capacity was extreme. 
After the victory at Tân Cảnh, VC General Hoàng Minh Thảo had freedom of maneuver. He called the shots. His troops moved freely among forests. He made up the appropriate and effective tactics. He set the attack time. He chose the areas for assault. But Colonel Bá did not have that privilege. He was restless, anxious and tired of waiting. 
The ARVN forces had B-52s, the terrifying and deadly weapons. Bomb rain could dropped at any time and anywhere. However, B-52s were effective when they were well used before the VC attack. That meant VC and ARVN forces were apart at an 800-meter safety distance. B-52s became ineffective when VCs had penetrated into the defense perimeter.

                Comparison between the 22nd Division and the 23rd Division forces:
                Colonel Lê Đức Đạt had the 42nd and 47th Regiments of the 22nd Division, the 2nd Airborne Brigade, and a cavalry regiment with two M-113 APC Companies and one M-41 Tank Company. Đạt also had an Artillery Brigade and LAWs, the anti-tank guns.
Colonel Bá sent back the remnants of the 22nd ARVN Division, of the 2nd Airborne Brigade and the 6th Ranger Brigade to Pleiku. He had only the 1/8th Armor Company with ten M-41 tanks. His division was composed of the 44th, 45th and 53rd Regiments, and an Artillery Regiment. Fortunately, he had TOWs, the state-of-the-art anti-tank guns, which were less manageable because they were mounted on the jeeps.  But Đạt didn’t. Bá also had Regional and Popular Forces of the Kontum Province.
Đạt’s ground forces were much stronger than Ba’s. Đạt and Bá had the same American and Vietnamese air powers. The question was why the 22nd ARVN Division was defeated easily and why the 2nd, the 10th and the 320th VC Divisions could not overcome the 23rd ARVN Division and Kontum province’s Regional and Popular forces.

ABOUT THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS:
                The American advisors were the brave and professional officers. However their tour of duty in Vietnam was one year for the infantrymen and thirteen months for the marines. They made an adventurous twelve-month service time in Vietnam. That duty time was too short to study and know well the relief features of the local areas. They did not know the weather and the structure of the land.
The US Armies were not ready for the People’s War. The American officers did not have constant observation and study of the People’s war developments. The lack of the combat experience in guerilla war made them impatient and unsuitable to a protracted war. They did not have the knowledge of battlefield obstacles and difficulties in Vietnam’s land such as swamp battlefields, forest combat, street combats and crowded village fights. They did not know how to deal with popular protests and demonstrations. Senior officers did not comprehend VC generals’ strategy and tactics. Besides, because the American officer advisors to the lower combat units did not speak Vietnamese and the Vietnamese officers were not fluent in English, the reports they made were erroneous and incomplete, based on untrue and false facts or based on  partial judgements and misunderstanding. After the Korean War, the Communist armies changed their strategy and combat tactics, but the US Armies did not. The most serious mistake was that a great number of officers and GIs did not comprehend the real and just cause of the Vietnam Wars. The American advisors applied the out-of-date tactics to combat the guerillas. They always attacked without plans based on first-hand information about the enemies’ situation (Bá 160). Those campaigns were costly in lives. 
Phillip B. Davidson tried to understand the People’s War or the revolutionary war. He said it had six aspects (Davidson 796). However, Davidson’s explanation was not entirely profound and complete.  The People’s War consisted of the strict control of the mind, the body and especially the stomach of the citizens by terrorism, police and propaganda. To Communist leaders, victories mattered most. They wasted Vietnamese’s lives without mercy both in the South and the North.
However there were strange stunning things in the U.S. history books. When the United States entered the WW I, the U.S. Army was not ready. When the United Sates went into the WW II, the U.S. Armies were not ready, either. The North Korea invaded the South Korean by surprise. General MacArthur’s Army could not stop the Chinese Red Army’s mass assaults. When Kennedy and Johnson governments were going to help the South Vietnam, the U.S. forces were not ready to combat the People’s War. Even now in the year of 2000, the terrorists blasted the USS Cole. The terrorism had started in Saigon, blowing up the American Building in Hàm Nghi Boulevard at Võ Duy Nghi Street, Mỹ Cảnh floating restaurant at Bạch Đằng Quay, Brink Building in Hai Bà Trưng Avenue…more than 30 years ago. The American governments did not take terrorism seriously until George W. Bush’s administration.
A great number of senior Vietnamese officers in charge carried out blindly what had been told.  They did not exploit the local information to execute the orders. They had no initiatives to fit the area situation. Binh Dương and Chu Pao battles showed that victories needed creative tactics. The South Vietnamese officers knew the Communists better than the American counterparts. They knew themselves well because they had been fighting the Vietcong for more than 20 years. The majority of Vietnamese officers and soldiers were the experienced and battle-seasoned fighting men, especially the noncoms. In the army, the noncoms’ experience decided the victories. They had to fight the Communists in their own way, a kind of counter-People’s War, and the American advisors supported them technically about the weaponry, ammunitions and air power. Flexible tactics and stratagems were needed to trick or to trap VCs and to vanquish the enemies’ tactics. The strategy of sticking to the areas, to the people and sometimes to the forests was ineffective and vulnerable. 
The ARVN Armies did not have updated weapons in time to counter-balance the enemy’s forces.   Always the ARVN forces ran after Vietcong’s about the weaponry, unit organization and in the combat. In 1965 before the 1968 Tết Offensive the VC had utilized AK-47, B-40 and B-41. Then the ARVN forces had AR-15 and M-79. After VCs had been equipped with SA-7 and AT-3 in Tân Cảnh battle, the 23rd ARVN Division had TOWs in Kontum battle.  In Ấp Bắc battle, many experienced .50 caliber machine gunners and M-113 leaders had been killed because no gun shields protected them. Then, the gun protection shields were fixed. Bá said, “In order to catch the tiger, people run after it. And the trophy is… its tail” (Bá 73, 276).
The consequences of ineffective strategy and the lack of creative tactics were evident, damaging and eroding. Vietnamese officers and soldiers wore out. The heroic fighting men spent many years in the remote camps where soldiers, their wives and their children lived in the trench bunkers. No American writers and journalists paid a tiny attention to that miserable situation. They wrote what they thought or presumed, not what they were supposed to witness.
American Armies suffered heavy casualties. Without knowledge of the real and just cause of Vietnam War, GIs’ morale eroded drastically. American people’s supporting opinion plummeted. 

CAUSES OF THE VICTORY:
                The question was what constituted the brilliant victory of the Kontum battle. 
There were lots of thinking, exact guesses, brilliant judgements, precise detailed preparations and effectual decisions, which resulted from hot arguments between Colonel Lý Tòng Bá and John Paul Vann, General Hill and Colonel Kellar. The more Bá and Vann argued, the more Vann understood Bá. The Kontum victory showed that Bá was right and Vann was right as well. Bá commanded and Vann supported.  That should have been the formula for the Counter-People’s War in the Vietnam War.
Brilliant judgements and exact guesses:
                Studying the elevation of Chu Pao Hill and the trail of lumber trucks, Bá decided to utilize tanks to surprise VCs on the Chu Pao hilltop. It was an ingenious tank combat in the mountain and it was the first tank combat in the armor history. And surprise was the main factor of any fight.
The firebase Polei-kleng was attacked and Bá predicted the VC “attacking the position and cutting off the reinforcements” tactic principle. That was the exact thinking and Vann saw it.
Bá emplaced the 44th Regiment on the Hill 501 because he knew that VC General Thao would seize that hill at any cost. If this strategic Hill 501 had been in the VC hand, the City of Kontum would have been shattered and the outcome would have been different. Bá had his best soldiers practice firing LAWs and told them to break down the VC tactic principle of “One-prong deep drive” into the commander’s headquarters. Bá gained the primary victory while VC got stunned and scattered at the first blow.
Bá knew that VC soldiers had to hug the belt within 800 meters from the ARVN positions to avoid the B-52 bomb rain. Bá requested the B-52 bombing safety range be shortened to 500 meters. He ordered a counter-attack with tanks and infantrymen only in the last phase when the VC forces had got into the defense perimeter, but not before. That was the key of the victory of Kontum.

Precise detailed preparations:
                Colonel Bá carried out the tactic principle of “luring tigers out of the forests”, concentrating his men in the Kontum perimeter. He prepared the killing grounds for VCs to show up. Outside Kontum City, areas were free of Montagnard villages and errant soldiers. They were free zone of firing and bombing.  Communist soldiers would be good preys for the B-52 bomb thunder into the mapped target boxes with uncanny accuracy. Vann said that outside Kontum, wherever B-52s dropped bombs, they scattered bodies.   Then Cobras exterminated the VC remnants. They helped South Vietnamese soldiers a lot, raking VCs around Kontum perimeter. Besides gunships, American C-130 aircraft landed at Kontum airfield, delivering valuable cargo of food and ammunition and replacing the two 10,000 gallon fuel bladders.  American pilots were real heroes. Vietnamese people would never forget to honor their bravery and their noble sacrifices for the sake of freedom of the  South Vietnam.
But there was no B-52 bombing when VC and SVN soldiers fought hand-to-hand, house by house and street by street right inside the city. So, the B-52s were deadly and effective, but they were not decisive. Infantry was always the queen of the battlefield. Andrade was right when he said, “Air strikes had failed to destroy the reinforced bunkers and they were too close to friendly units to allow the use of B-52s….It took infantry to punctuate the victory” (Andrade 354-355). However, South Vietnamese officers wondered why Andrade added, “The key to this pyrrhic victory was American power---lots of it-….It was ironic that…air power was unable to defeat the North Vietnamese,…” (Andrade 355). These strange observations denoted that Andrade did not understand Bá’s defensive plan of Kontum.
To enhance soldiers’ morale, Bá came to the defense frontlines to solve disputes or to encourage fighting men. He ordered the best soldiers to practice firing LAWs. So they would be confident that T-54 tanks were strong, big but vulnerable, and they were capable to destroy them. Captured prisoners were presented to the ARVN soldiers who saw those young poor teenagers. VCs were not terrible monsters but stupid living machines manipulated by fanatic extremist Communist leaders. The Communist soldiers’ pictures Bá presented with first-hand evidences were different from the ones that haunted General Dzu and others after the Tân Cảnh - Dak Tô defeat. Bá knew clearly that Communist leaders were experts in picturing out ghostly images by propaganda, by whispering gossips, and by terrorism. The 23rd ARVN Division and Kontum Province’s Regional and Popular Forces had confidence in their victory. That was the core of the victory. And Bá got it.

Effectual decisions:
                VC General Thảo utilized tanks to infuse fear to Republic soldiers as well as neutralize the command headquarters. The effective way was to destroy the first coming VC tanks. As a matter of fact, once T-54 tanks were knocked off, the supporting units were thrown into disorder. Their morale waned, but the ARVN soldiers’ spirit heightened. The building of the second division command bunker was an excellent decision to avoid the destructive shelling. Andrade wrote, “The enemy was acting contrary to standard procedure by neglecting the heavy use of artillery before an infantry assault…North Vietnamese commanders apparently decided to forego the customary artillery preparation and go straight for Kontum’s heart” (Andrade 317). They ordered their T-54 tanks to open the way for the infantrymen to go straight to the heart of the ARVN Division staff. This observation was not entirely exact. In fact, there were two tactic principles for the assault. The first one was “first artillery hammering, last infantry assault.” The second was “One-prong deep drive into the commanding brain.” VC General Hoàng Minh Thảo had been VC Four-Star General Văn Tiến Dũng’s subordinate. Bá was sure that Thảo would apply the second tactic principle.
The other creative initiative was the centralization of forces with the perimeter defense, instead of point of appui (grouping) defense, leaving areas for VCs to concentrate. This formation of defense had lots of advantages. All military forces constituted a granite block that would engulf any unexpectedly intruding VC unit. Outside the block the air power and the artillery were free to bomb and to fire. The division command staff mapped the suspect VC staging areas. With just one phone call, the B-52 pilot teams or the Air Command in Pleiku or Colonel Hùng, the Artillery commander knew where it was. 
In the case when the intruders were stubborn, the reserve forces consisting of the 1/8th M-41Tank Company with supporting units were going to root them out. 
                The Kontum battle developments occurred exactly with what Ba had conceived. 

COMPARING TÂN CẢNH AND KONTUM DEFENSIVE PLANS:
Similarities:
                The 22nd ARVN Division and the 23rd ARVN Division had the same advisors. John Paul Vann and other American advisors in the division command headquarters and in the regiment command staffs helped Colonel Đạt with what, when and where he needed. The same air power was ready to fire and bomb the enemy forces.  
The question was why Đạt let the 22nd ARVN Division crumble so easily. The answer resided in the dissimilarities between Đạt’s and Bá’s defensive plans.
Dissimilarities:
                At Tân Cảnh there was no coordination between units and counterparts. Their units stationed separately. Đạt was at Tân Cảnh with the 42nd Regiment while the 47th Regiment at Dakto II, four miles in the West from Tân Cảnh. Especially the 14th Cavalry Regiment was positioned at Bến Hét in the West on the Road 512 more than 10 miles from Tân Cảnh. On their way to rescue Tân Cảnh, they were blocked by AT-3 ambushes at Dak Tô II, already captured by the enemies. In Kontum there was a unity of command and unity of resistance. The M-41 Tank Company protected the division command headquarters and a secret weapon for the last moment was located in the center of the defense.
At Tân Cảnh the VC commanders knew the position of the 22nd ARVN Division command Headquarters. Before their assault, Vietcong artillery launched wire-guided AT-3 missiles called as Saggers and shelled cannon bullets to Tân Cảnh compound. One of them darted directly at the 22nd ARVN Division command bunker, traversing the sandbag wall, slicing through burlap bags of sand, and blew up the radio room. Then the VC captain of the T-54 tank team ordered his crews to roll their tanks through the gate of the camp and approached the command bunker opening. No soldier was left to stop VC tanks. The VC tanks shelled rounds and rounds into the bunker. 
In Kontum, there were two headquarters. The same VC tank leader risked his life, invading the defense perimeter to look for the division commander bunker. What happened to him was that he lost his life and his tank was captured intact. The 23rd ARVN Division Commander wasn’t there. Later VC General Thảo heard Bá’s encouraging speech through the public speakers. “Bá never dies,” people said confidently.
The comparison of the two defensive maps showed how vulnerable Đạt’s plan was. The 42nd ARVN Regiment with a platoon of M-41 tank protected the 22nd ARVN Division command Headquarters at Tân Cảnh. The 47th ARVN Regiment with one Airborne Battalion and one M-41 Company stationed at Dak To II, four miles in the West on the Route 512. The M-113 Brigade, the strong and protective forces, was at Bến Hét, more than ten miles in the West from the 22nd ARVN Division Headquarters. Dak Tô I was at four miles in the North. Positioned in the form of a long L, strong unit sisters were isolated from each other. Therefore it was impossible for a rescue or a counter-attack. 
Another great difference was Đạt’s low morale and weak personality. Sitting in a chair and staring at nothing, he said to Colonel Kaplan that the 22nd Division would be overrun. Đạt thought that VC forces were stronger than ARVN’s and that VC would surely win. Đạt’s combat spirit was very low and his accepting easily the defeat daunted John Paul Vann, Kaplan and his soldiers. When VC tanks came, his soldiers refused to get out of their foxholes to knock them off. Đạt simply shrugged in resignation. He did nothing to enhance the soldiers’ courage.
On the contrary, Bá showed his soldiers the frightened captured VC teenagers. He told his men, “Step on VCs’ heads and go forward.” Bá went to the frontline to command directly his subalterns or check his soldiers, their foxholes and their weapons. He wanted to make sure that every thing was all right for the defense. He showed his soldiers his fearless personality and his determination to win.
Bá thought that the victory resided in the commander’s brain and personality. He asked himself what he got, how many soldiers he got, how strong his forces were, how he was going to maneuver to enhance his ground forces and to wield the existing air power. His division had to fight three VC divisions with state-of-the-art Soviet weapons. He conceived the most effective defense formation so that the B-52 air power reached the deadliest limit to weaken the enemy forces before any assault. By combat experience,
he knew what Communist General Hoàng Minh Thảo was going to do and how Thảo would carry it out.  That was the old but basic principle of the Oriental combat tactics, “With the knowledge of the own strengths and weaknesses and of the enemies’ ones, hundred battles result in hundred victories.”
The Kontum victory stunned not only the American and Vietnamese governments and generals, but also VC generals and Bộ Đội. After April 30, 1975, when Bá was detained in Củ Chi, VC soldiers tried to take a look at Bá, but the guerrilla guard told them, “Bá is simply a Vietnamese” [like you and me].  At Củ Chi, Bá was ordered to star in a made-up film as a surrendering officer who was getting out of his bunker. The film was not true, but it obtained the Golden Eagle Prize in the East Germany Film Festival (Bá 201). During his detention in Củ Chi, many VC generals and colonels, including General Hoàng Minh Thảo nicknamed B3, came to identify Bá (Bá 195). 
What did American historians write about Nguyễn Huệ Offensive? Davidson wrote, “The final inescapable truth to emerge from the offensive was that ARVN soldiers could neither stop the enemy without significant American air support nor could their counteroffensive have succeeded without it” (Davidson 712). Moss followed Davidson, “Once again, Vietnamization had failed a crucial test” (Moss 387).  One thing that American historians and reporters had ignored was the air strike saved experienced Republic soldiers’ lives, especially noncoms’.  It took at least three or four years and a lot of money to train a good noncom. Besides, the heavy casualties influenced the armed forces’ morale. To neutralized mass attack, B-52 rain bombing was a must. Bá wrote that even if the ARVN soldiers won hundred battles, no American journalists or historians reported a single victory positively. But if the ARVN forces suffered a “withdrawal” like the case of the 3rd ARVN Division in Quảng Trị Province, the Vietcong and American pro-Vietcong war activists explored it with great details, exaggerating and fictionalizing it dramatically. 
Why did Davidson and Moss not report the disappearing of the 2nd “Yellow Star” Division from the North Vietnam Army and the defeat of the 200,000-VC Nguyễn Huệ campaign?  How many VC died in Quảng Trị province, An Lộc battle and Kontum battle? How many VCs were left after their “withdrawal”?  Why did Moss, Davidson, anchor Cronkite and others not analyze the Nguyễn Huệ Campaign defeat?  Why didn’t they characterize the VC defeats with the adjectives they had applied to the ARVN? The “failure of the Vietnamization” resulted in Võ Nguyên Giáp’s stepping down. Davidson and Moss did not know that the B-52 air power was the effective weapon against VC leaders’ mass attack like TOWs for tanks. Had they known that without B-52s, the Red Chinese Army had chased the American soldiers who had run as fast as rabbits on the North Korean land during the Korea War? 
Consequently President Nixon felt relieved of the defeat shadow. The American and Vietnamese delegations in the Paris Conference would negotiate on the strong point. 

CONCLUSION:
The victory of the Kontum battle resulted from the well-thought plan designed by General Lý Tòng Bá, seconded by John Paul Vann, perfectly performed by General Hill, Colonel Rhotenberry, American advisors, USAF pilots, Vietnamese officers, and executed by the 23rd ARVN brave soldiers, by courageous Regional and Popular militiamen and fearless VNAF pilots. It was an original ingenious coherent defensive plan ever conceived by a competent Vietnamese General. It was based on the deep knowledge of VC strategy and tactics, and a long-time combat experience. General Bá knew his division’s strengths and weaknesses as well as his enemies’ones.  Bá always combined his expertise with his creative initiatives to fit the time and location (Bá 78). He studied the technical and tactical modifications to overcome the new combat difficulties. In Trial by Fire Andrade wrote, “Bá would be the front behind which Vann could pull the strings in the final battle at Kontum” (Andrade 286). How come Andrade could write such a false made-up statement, twenty years after the war had been over?
Bá won the Kontum battle, but he lost John Paul Vann, a good friend, a brave and professional comrade in arm, an American liberty fighter for a free South Vietnam. John Paul Vann was a bright shinning Liberty stone while John Kerry and his anti-Vietnam War or pro-Vietcong War comrades were naively duped by VC leaders.  These pro-Vietcong-war activists were breathing the air without knowing its existence. They denied the freedom they were enjoying. Their forefathers had obtained it by blood. Living in a Country of Liberty, they were the free citizens who supported and praised the war criminals, the Communist dictators, eager to establish a non-human-right regime in Vietnam.

Below are the maps: Assault map to Chu Pao, Kontum Battle (phase 1 & phase 2)

               


Works cited:
Andradé, Dale, Trial by Fire. The 1972 Easter Offensive America's Last Vietnam Battle. Hippocrene Books. New York.

Davidson, Phillip B. Vietnam At War. The History: 1946-1975. Oxford University Pess. New York: Oxford, 1988/

Lý, Bá Tòng. Hồi Ký 25 Năm Khói Lửa-- Memoir of Twenty-five Years on the Battlefields. Tú Quỳnh Publisher & Books. Garden Grove, Ca 92841: Fourth Edition, 1999/

Moss, George Donelson. Vietnam: An American Ordeal. Third Edison. Prentice Hall. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458:1990

Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. Random House: New York: 1988